



# Reinforcement learning based privacy-preserving consensus tracking control of nonstrict-feedback discrete-time multi-agent systems<sup>\*#</sup>

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**Abstract:** This paper investigates a privacy-preserving consensus tracking problem for a class of nonstrict-feedback discrete-time multi-agent systems (MASs). An improved Liu cryptosystem is developed to alleviate the errors between encryption and decryption on the plaintext, which ensures satisfactory recovery of the plaintext information. A reinforcement learning (RL) technique is then employed to compensate for unknown dynamics and errors between true signals and decrypted ones. Based on the backstepping and graph theory, an RL-based privacy-preserving consensus tracking control strategy is further designed. By virtue of graph theory and Lyapunov stability theory, it is shown that the consensus tracking errors and all signals in the MAS are ultimately bounded. Finally, simulation examples are presented for verification of the effectiveness of the control strategy.

**Key words:** Multi-agent systems; Consensus tracking; Privacy-preserving; Reinforcement learning

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## 1 Introduction

In recent years, consensus control of multi-agent systems (MASs) has attracted extensive attention in the control community (Zhang HG et al., 2017; Li HY et al., 2021; He et al., 2022; Ju et al., 2022; Wen

and Li, 2022; Yang XD et al., 2022; Li JN et al., 2023; Zhang XM et al., 2023). This is primarily because consensus control finds its broad applications in diverse areas, as discussed by multiple autonomous vehicles (Shahvali et al., 2018; Peng et al., 2021; Ge XH et al., 2022, 2023, 2024; Xie et al., 2022), manipulators (Yu et al., 2019), aerospace engineering (Sakthivel et al., 2019), mobile robots (Ding et al., 2020; Ning et al., 2023), and power systems (Li P et al., 2022). Although MASs provide flexible and convenient platforms for industry and military applications, they are vulnerable to sensitive information disclosure due to their openness over shared networks. Research on privacy protection of MASs is thus of great significance (Nozari et al., 2017; Gao L et al., 2019; Kishida, 2019; Ruan et al., 2019; Wang YQ, 2019; Yin et al., 2020; Fang et al., 2021; Wang

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YQ et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2021; Liang et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2023).

Many techniques have been developed for preserving privacy in consensus control, such as homomorphic encryption (Fang et al., 2021; Wang YQ et al., 2021; Chen et al., 2023), differential privacy (Yang ZW et al., 2022), and state decomposition (Wang YQ, 2019). Specifically, Chen et al. (2023) addressed a privacy-preserving economic dispatch issue for microgrids by a homomorphically encrypted consensus strategy. Yan et al. (2021) and Wang AJ et al. (2022) offered distributed privacy protection algorithms and consensus-based economic dispatch strategies, ensuring information security and node privacy. In Fang et al. (2021), a homomorphic encryption based protocol was generalized for a second-order system. In Wang YQ et al. (2021), an agent decomposition strategy was introduced via Paillier encryption, and the security of agents' initial states was analyzed. It is worth pointing out that these results do not consider the impact of privacy-preserving errors in an MAS, and these errors are of paramount importance in consensus behaviors.

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a vital role in consensus control. A common architecture of RL is a critic-actor form. With the actor-critic architecture, state-feedback and output-feedback optimal control methods were proposed in Tong et al. (2018) and Li YM et al. (2020a, 2022) under the framework of backstepping technique. Li YM et al. (2020a) investigated an adaptive fuzzy inverse optimal control problem and developed an inverse optimal scheme. To address the issue of adaptive control of large-scale systems in strict-feedback form, a feedforward decentralized controller with adaptive laws was designed in Tong et al. (2018) using a state observer with the backstepping design technique. For strict-feedback systems containing unknown internal dynamics and immeasurable constrained states, an adaptive neural network output-feedback optimized control algorithm was designed in Li YM et al. (2022). For the optimal distributed consensus control of discrete-time MASs with unknown dynamics, Yang XD et al. (2022) proposed a data-based distributed control algorithm to enhance online learning capabilities using policy gradient RL. For discrete-time MASs with dead zones, an adaptive fault-tolerant tracking scheme (Li HY et al., 2021) was developed by combining the backstepping

technique with an RL algorithm. For the consensus problem in nonlinear MASs, an off-policy model-free algorithm based on RL (Wang H and Li, 2022) was proposed for achieving fully cooperative consensus, thereby further expanding the scope of the research. Subsequently, an optimization leader-following consensus control method based on RL (Wen and Li, 2022) was developed for a second-order MAS with unknown dynamics. To address the consensus problem of higher-order nonlinear MASs with uncertainties and communication delays, a sliding mode control design method (Li JN et al., 2023) was developed based on the principle of sliding mode control and RL techniques.

In spite of the fruitful results in consensus control for MASs, there still exist several technical challenges:

1. It is noteworthy that, although the aforementioned consensus results (Li HY et al., 2021; Wang H and Li, 2022; Wen and Li, 2022; Yang XD et al., 2022; Li JN et al., 2023) are from RL techniques, they fail to consider privacy leakage risks during information transmission among agents, where state information is sensitive in some application scenarios.

2. In Liu DX (2013), the Liu cryptosystem uses a large number of random sequences to create a ciphertext. Actually, although these random numbers increase data privacy, they lead to a decryption error between a plaintext and a decrypted plaintext. There is still a lack of theory for improving decryption performance. Further technique is thus necessary to mitigate decryption errors arising from random numbers.

3. Since there inevitably exist decryption errors in a cryptosystem, given that the existence of errors poses a technical challenge for consensus analysis, we may infer that such errors have an impact on consensus performance. Regrettably, the existing results (Wang YQ, 2019; Fang et al., 2021; Wang YQ et al., 2021; Liang et al., 2022) on encryption techniques lack analysis for decryption errors, let alone elucidations of the means for dealing with these errors.

To fill in these gaps, we propose an RL-based privacy-preserving consensus tracking control strategy for a nonstrict-feedback discrete MAS. The specific technical contributions of this paper are summarized below.

1. An improved Liu cryptosystem is proposed via signal amplification. Signal amplification is for

reduction of the error between encryption and decryption. Different from the Paillier encryption algorithm (Gao C et al., 2021; Yang ZW et al., 2022), an amplification operation is performed on plaintext before the encryption process in this research, increasing its proportion in the ciphertext. According to the decryption algorithm, the decrypted plaintext contains two parts, namely the original plaintext and a random component. The amplification of the plaintext results in a reduction in the proportion of the random component. As a result, the impact of the error between encryption and decryption on the plaintext is alleviated, allowing for satisfactory recovery of the plaintext information.

2. An RL-based privacy-preserving consensus tracking control strategy is proposed for nonstrict-feedback discrete-time MASs. With the improved privacy-preserving mechanism, an RL technology is introduced. Different from RL methods (Li HY et al., 2021; Wang H and Li, 2022; Wen and Li, 2022; Yang XD et al., 2022; Li JN et al., 2023), the strategy safeguards sensitive information to ensure the privacy of agents' interaction. For error signals generated by the improved privacy-preserving mechanism, our RL strategy treats them as unknown terms and compensates them online. This strategy not only provides effective solutions for protecting sensitive information but also improves consensus performance for an MAS.

## 2 Problem formulation and preliminaries

### 2.1 Graph theory

A graph is introduced to describe information flow among agents. A directed graph  $\mathcal{G} = \{\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}\}$  is considered, where  $\mathcal{V} = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  represents a set of non-empty nodes,  $\mathcal{E} \subseteq \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{V}$  is the edge set that fulfills the condition, and  $\mathcal{A} = [a_{i,j}] \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$  represents the connectivity among agents. Edge  $(j, i) \in \mathcal{E}$  stands for an edge from node  $j$  to node  $i$ . In  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $a_{i,j} > 0$  if node  $i$  is able to send information to node  $j$ . Otherwise,  $a_{i,j} = 0$ .  $a_{i,i} = 0$  denotes the prohibition of self-transmission and self-reception of information.  $\mathcal{D} = \text{diag}\{\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_N\}$ , among which  $d_i = \sum_{j=1}^N a_{i,j}$ , is a diagonal matrix. The Laplacian matrix of  $\mathcal{G}$  is  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{D} - \mathcal{A}$ . The neighbor set of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  agent is  $\mathcal{N}_i = \{j | (j, i) \in \mathcal{E}\}$ .  $\bar{\mathcal{V}} = \{\bar{\mathcal{V}}, \bar{\mathcal{E}}\}$  is an

augmented graph, where  $\bar{\mathcal{V}} = \{0, 1, \dots, N\}$  and  $\bar{\mathcal{E}} = \bar{\mathcal{V}} \times \bar{\mathcal{V}}$  with 0 being the leader. If node  $i$  can receive the information from the leader,  $a_{i,0} > 0$ ; otherwise,  $a_{i,0} = 0$ . We define  $\mathcal{B} = \text{diag}\{a_{1,0}, a_{2,0}, \dots, a_{N,0}\}$ .

### 2.2 Problem formulation

We consider a nonstrict-feedback MAS consisting of one leader and  $N$  followers with an  $n^{\text{th}}$ -order form, and the dynamics of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower is

$$\begin{cases} x_{i,1}(k+1) = f_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) + g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))x_{i,2}(k), \\ x_{i,2}(k+1) = f_{i,2}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) + g_{i,2}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))x_{i,3}(k), \\ \vdots \\ x_{i,n_i}(k+1) = f_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) + g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))u_i(k) \\ \quad + \varpi_i(k), \\ y_i(k) = x_{i,1}(k), \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where  $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ ,  $x_{i,l}(k) \in \mathbb{R}$  is a state variable with  $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i$ ,  $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k) = [x_{i,1}(k), x_{i,2}(k), \dots, x_{i,n_i}(k)]^T \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}$  represents the state vector,  $y_i(k) \in \mathbb{R}$  is the follower's output,  $u_i(k) \in \mathbb{R}$  is an input signal,  $f_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))$  is an unknown and smooth function denoting uncertain dynamics,  $g_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))$  is a non-zero function representing control gains, and  $\varpi_i(k)$  denotes external disturbance, which is unknown but bounded, satisfying  $|\varpi_i(k)| \leq \bar{\varpi}_i$  with  $\bar{\varpi}_i \geq 0$ .

**Remark 1** The distinctive feature of nonstrict feedback is that the unknown nonlinear functions  $f_{i,l}(\cdot)$  and  $g_{i,l}(\cdot)$  of each subsystem include all state variables, implying that all state variables exist in the  $l^{\text{th}}$ -order differential subsystem of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower (Sun KK et al., 2021; Sun JL et al., 2022). Their applications are also widespread, such as marine surface vessels (Qi et al., 2023), wheeled mobile robots (Ding et al., 2021), single-link robots (Zhou et al., 2018), and electromechanical systems (Li YM et al., 2020b). However, nonstrict-feedback followers still pose challenges in control law design due to the occurrence of the algebraic loop problem (Tong et al., 2016) when applying the existing adaptive backstepping technique. Therefore, it is necessary to develop new design approaches.

**Assumption 1** (Ding et al., 2020, 2021) The function  $g_{i,l}(\cdot)$  is unknown but bounded, satisfying  $0 < \underline{g}_{i,l} \leq |g_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))| \leq \bar{g}_{i,l}$ , where  $\underline{g}_{i,l}$  and  $\bar{g}_{i,l}$  are unknown positive constants.

**Assumption 2** The topology graph  $\bar{\mathcal{G}}$  contains a spanning tree with the leader being the root node.

We define the consensus tracking error  $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{y} - (y_d \otimes \mathbf{I}_N)$  between the leader and the followers, where  $y_d$  is the leader’s signal,  $\mathbf{y} = [y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N]^T$ , “ $\otimes$ ” is the Kronecker product, and  $\mathbf{I}_N$  is an  $N$ -dimensional identity vector. If the norm of this error converges to a small neighborhood around the origin, the MAS is said to achieve consensus tracking.


In a complex network environment, there exists a vulnerability for the exchange of sensitive information to take place in a way that reaches malicious eavesdroppers or adversaries, resulting in adverse effects on the consensus performance. This paper focuses mainly on addressing the privacy-preserving consensus tracking issue. Followers perform tracking control according to the leader’s signal and output signals from their neighbors. The information transmission process is shown in Fig. 1. The output signal  $y_i$  in the MAS and  $y_d$  from the leader are exposed to public networks and can be easily intercepted, potentially compromising the tracking consensus. It is thus necessary to investigate methods for ensuring the security of the transmission information, such as  $y_d$  and  $y_i$ , thereby guaranteeing a privacy-preserving consensus.

The control objective of this paper is to develop an RL-based privacy-preserving control strategy that enables an MAS to achieve consensus tracking while ensuring that all signals are ultimately bounded.

For a follower in Eq. (1), a distributed synchronization error for follower  $i$  is defined as

$$e_{i,1}(k) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} a_{i,j}(y_i(k) - y_j(k)) + a_{i,0}(y_i(k) - y_d(k)), \quad (2)$$

and a vector containing all synchronization errors is denoted as  $\mathbf{e}_1 = [e_{1,1}, e_{2,1}, \dots, e_{N,1}]^T$ . According to the knowledge related to the graph theory, we obtain



**Fig. 1** Information transmission process in a multi-agent system

the relationship between  $\mathbf{e}_1$  and  $\mathbf{e}$  as follows:

$$\mathbf{e}_1 = (\mathcal{L} + \mathcal{B})\mathbf{e} = \mathcal{H}\mathbf{e}. \quad (3)$$

### 3 Reinforcement learning (RL) based strategy with a privacy-preserving method

In this section, an RL-based adaptive consensus tracking control strategy with a privacy-preserving method is proposed for a nonstrict-feedback nonlinear discrete-time MAS. This control strategy incorporates an improved Liu cryptosystem, critic neural networks (NNs), and actor NNs. The improved Liu cryptosystem is used primarily for encryption and decryption of followers’ information. Critic NNs use synchronization errors as reward and penalty signals to design the utility function, while actor NNs combine Liu decrypted information with the utility function to design control laws. More details are presented in the following subsections.

#### 3.1 Improved Liu cryptosystem

One of the common approaches adopted for addressing the privacy-preserving issue presented in Section 2.2 is the safeguarding of information via encrypted transmission. Currently, a series of encryption techniques appear, such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) (Rivest et al., 1978) and Elgamal (Elgamal, 1985) algorithms. In this paper, we introduce a cryptosystem called the Liu cryptosystem, and it holds distinct characteristics compared with the aforementioned algorithms. Liu cryptosystem contains a private-key-based algorithm that employs only private keys during the encryption and decryption processes without the requirement for a public key. In contrast to asymmetric encryption algorithms, which involve the utilization of both public and private keys, the Liu cryptosystem adopts a simpler encryption method while achieving an equivalent level of confidentiality.

**Remark 2** Compared with RSA (Reddy et al., 2023) and homomorphic encryption (Zuo et al., 2021; Zhang P et al., 2023), the encryption method in this paper requires only a single key for encryption and decryption, with simplified key management. This cryptosystem reduces requirements for data format, allowing for direct encryption and decryption of diverse data, whereas the methods in other studies



(Gao C et al., 2021; Yang ZW et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2023) require data to be converted into integers, unavoidably introducing quantization errors. Compared with the traditional Liu cryptosystem (Liu DX, 2013), the improved method yields the result that decrypted plaintext is closer to the original one under identical conditions.

The Liu cryptosystem (Liu DX, 2013) is employed to encrypt the information exchanged among the MASs. Its principle is to generate a private key consisting of four random numbers and share it with the sender and receiver. Then the sender encrypts the plaintext using the private key for transmission, and the receiver decrypts the ciphertext using the same private key for obtaining the plaintext. The Liu cryptosystem consists of two parts, namely the encryption and decryption algorithms. The block diagram of the Liu cryptosystem is shown in Fig. 2. In this block diagram, a private key  $K(M) = \{(q_1, s_1, t_1), (q_2, s_2, t_2), \dots, (q_M, s_M, t_M)\}$  is generated, where  $q_i \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $s_i \in \mathbb{R}$ , and  $t_i \in \mathbb{R}$  are randomly generated and shared with the sender and receiver,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, M$ , and  $M \in \mathbb{Z}$ . This cryptosystem requires  $M \geq 3$ ,  $q_j \neq 0$ , and  $q_M + s_M + t_M \neq 0$ , and only one  $j$  satisfies  $t_j \neq 0$ ,  $1 \leq j \leq M - 1$ . Upon receiving the private key  $K(M)$ , the sender uses the Liu encryption algorithm  $\text{Enc}(K(M), m)$  to encrypt the plaintext  $m$ , resulting in a series of ciphertext  $\bar{c}_{m,M} = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_M\}$ , which is transmitted over the network. At the receiver's terminal, upon receiving the ciphertext  $\bar{c}_{m,M}$ , the Liu decryption algorithm  $\text{Dec}(K(M), \bar{c}_{m,M})$  is applied using the private key  $K(M)$  to obtain the decrypted plaintext  $\hat{m}$ . With this transmission process, sensitive messages over networks are protected.

Based on a commonsense perspective, the Liu cryptosystem has been designed in a way that uses a large number of random numbers to create a ciphertext. According to the results in Liu DX (2013), the creation of ciphertext is from  $c_i = q_i t_i m + s_i r_M +$




Fig. 2 Block diagram of the Liu cryptosystem

$q_i(r_i - r_{i-1})$  in the Liu encryption algorithm. In the Liu decryption algorithm,  $\hat{m} = (\sum_{i=1}^{M-1} (c_i - S s_i) / q_i) / T = (\sum_{i=1}^{M-1} (\frac{A_i}{q_i} + \frac{B_i - S s_i}{q_i})) / T$ , where  $T = \sum_{i=1}^{M-1} t_i$ , and  $S = \frac{c_M}{q_M + t_M + s_M}$ . We further obtain  $\hat{m} = m + \varepsilon$ , where  $\varepsilon = (\sum_{i=1}^{M-1} \frac{B_i - S s_i}{q_i}) / T$ . This indicates that  $\varepsilon$  determines the decryption performance. To elaborate, if the value of  $\frac{\varepsilon}{m + \varepsilon}$  becomes smaller, the relationship between  $\hat{m}$  and  $m$  reveals that  $\hat{m}$  is closer to  $m$ . There exist two methods for reduction of the value of  $\frac{\varepsilon}{m + \varepsilon}$ : the first is to decrease  $\varepsilon$ , and the second is to amplify the value of  $m$ . Actually, in the first method,  $\varepsilon$  contains numerous random numbers, and it is difficult to adjust its size precisely. We prefer the second method and are going to amplify the value of  $m$  for improvement of the decryption performance.

From the phenomenon and motivation, an improved Liu cryptosystem is proposed. Its main idea is to increase the magnitude of plaintext and reduce the magnitude of random terms in ciphertext calculation, and the action alleviates the impact of random terms on the error between  $m$  and  $\hat{m}$ , resulting in a better reproducibility of  $m$  with privacy protection. Its process is summarized in Algorithm 1, and its block diagram is shown in Fig. 3.

**Remark 3** As the magnitude of the data is sufficiently large, it is not necessary to multiply it by  $k_p$  before encryption actually takes place. However, due to the inability to accurately determine the magnitude of the data, it is a common practice to multiply the data by an amplification parameter  $k_p$  before performing the encryption operation. From

#### Algorithm 1 Improved Liu cryptosystem

- 1: Initialization of parameters  $M, k_p, T = 0, T_1 = 0$ ;
- 2: Plaintext  $\rightarrow m$
- 3: Amplify the signal  $m_A = k_p m$
- 4: **Generation of the private key**  $K(M)$ : randomly generate  $r_n, q_n, t_n$ , and  $s_n, n = 1, 2, \dots, M$ ;
- 5: **Encryption**( $\text{Enc}(K(M), m_A)$ ):  $c_1 = q_1 t_1 m_A + s_1 r_M + q_1 (r_1 - r_{M-1})$ ;
- 6:  $i = 2$  to  $M - 1$   
 $c_i = q_i t_i m_A + s_i r_M + q_i (r_i - r_{i-1})$ ,  $c_M = (q_M s_M t_M) r_M$ ,  
 $c_{M+1} = c_M$ ;
- 7: **Decryption**( $\text{Dec}(K(M), \bar{c}_{m_A, M})$ )
- 8:  $i = 2$  to  $M - 1$   
 $T = T + t_i$ ,  
 $S = c_M / (q_M + s_M + t_M)$ ;
- 9:  $i = 2$  to  $M - 1$   
 $T_1 = T_1 + (c_i - S s_i) / q_i$ ,  
 $\hat{m}_A = T_1 / T$
- 10: **Output**  $\hat{m} = \hat{m}_A / k_p$




Fig. 3 Block diagram of the improved Liu cryptosystem

$c_i = q_i t_i m_A + s_i r_M + q_i (r_i - r_{i-1})$  and  $\hat{m} = m + \varepsilon$  with  $\varepsilon = \frac{1}{T} (\sum_{i=1}^{M-1} \frac{B_i - S s_i}{q_i})$ , the analysis indicates that the privacy information is the transformation between random numbers and plaintext.

The gain  $k_p$  serves primarily to amplify plaintext into  $m_A = k_p m$ , and this operation reduces the value of  $\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon + m}$  for describing the impact of encryption and decryption errors. Output information is encrypted into ciphertext for transmission with  $k_p$  being independent of this process. It is broadcasted to all agents but is not considered encrypted content. Even if  $k_p$  leaks, eavesdroppers lacking decryption algorithms cannot access any of the actual information. Thus, the leakage of  $k_p$  does not exercise a negative impact on privacy preservation.

### 3.2 Strategic utility function and critic neural networks

For a follower in information reception, it is necessary to decrypt an encrypted signal for obtaining the true value. The distributed synchronization error  $e_{i,1}(k)$  in Eq. (2) is thus represented as  $\check{e}_{i,1}(k) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} a_{i,j} (y_i(k) - \hat{y}_j(k)) + a_{i,0} (y_i(k) - \hat{y}_d(k))$ , where  $\hat{y}_i(k)$  is the decrypted information of follower  $i$  via the improved Liu decryption algorithm, and  $\hat{y}_d(k)$  is the decrypted information of the leader.

According to Li HY et al. (2021) and Bai et al. (2020b), the utility function is chosen as

$$\zeta_i(k) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } |\check{e}_{i,1}(k)| \leq \sigma, \\ 1, & \text{if } |\check{e}_{i,1}(k)| > \sigma, \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

where  $\sigma$  is a threshold related to the tolerance of consensus tracking performance, and  $\zeta_i(k)$  is a real-time index depending on the consensus tracking performance. With the utility function (4), we consider the long-term performance of the MAS and define

the long-term strategic utility function as

$$\phi_i(k) = \beta_i^\rho \zeta_i(k+1) + \beta_i^{\rho-1} \zeta_i(k+2) + \dots + \beta_i^{k+1} \zeta_i(\rho), \quad (5)$$

where  $\beta_i$  is a weight satisfying  $0 < \beta_i < 1$ ,  $\rho$  is the total number of steps, and  $\phi_i(k)$  represents the cumulative performance index with subsequent steps.

With the critic NNs approximating the long-term strategic utility function (5), we obtain  $\phi_i(k) = (\theta_{i,\phi}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k) + \varepsilon_{i,\phi}(k)$ , where  $\theta_{i,\phi}^* = [\theta_{i,\phi,1}^*, \theta_{i,\phi,2}^*, \dots, \theta_{i,\phi,\gamma_{i,\phi}}^*]^T \in \mathbb{R}^{\gamma_{i,\phi}}$  is the ideal weight vector,  $\gamma_{i,\phi}$  is the number of NN's nodes,  $\mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k)$  is the NN basis function vector, and  $\varepsilon_{i,\phi}(k)$  is the approximate error. From Bai et al. (2020b), we perceive that  $\|\theta_{i,\phi}^*\| \leq \bar{\theta}_{i,\phi}$  and  $|\varepsilon_{i,\phi}(k)| \leq \bar{\varepsilon}_{i,\phi}$  with  $\bar{\theta}_{i,\phi}$  and  $\bar{\varepsilon}_{i,\phi}$  being unknown positive constants. In the following part related to the design of control strategy, these properties are covered at each step.

As  $\phi_i(k)$  is an unknown ideal value, only its estimated value  $\hat{\phi}_i(k) = \hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k)$  can be obtained, where  $\hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}$  is the estimate of  $\theta_{i,\phi}$ .  $E_{i,\phi}(k) = \beta_i \hat{\phi}_i(k) - [\hat{\phi}_i(k-1) - \zeta_i(k)]$  represents the Bellman error. Based on  $J_{i,\phi}(k) = \frac{1}{2} E_{i,\phi}^2(k)$  and the method from Bai et al. (2020b), the derivation of  $\hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}(k)$  can take as

$$\hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}(k+1) = \hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}(k) - \mu_{i,\phi} \beta_i \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k) [\beta_i \hat{\phi}_i(k) - \hat{\phi}_i(k-1) + \zeta_i(k)], \quad (6)$$

where  $\mu_{i,\phi}$  is a positive parameter.

### 3.3 RL-based privacy-preserving consensus tracking control strategy

Similar to transformation technology for a nonlinear discrete system in Ge SS et al. (2003) and Bai et al. (2020a), for facilitating the strategy design, the

$i^{\text{th}}$  follower (1) is transformed as

$$\begin{cases} x_{i,1}(k+n_i) = f_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) \\ \quad + g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))x_{i,2}(k+n_i-1), \\ x_{i,2}(k+n_i-1) = f_{i,2}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) \\ \quad + g_{i,2}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))x_{i,3}(k+n_i-2), \\ x_{i,n_i}(k+1) = f_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) \\ \quad + g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))u_i(k) + \varpi_i(k), \\ y_i(k) = x_{i,1}(k), \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N. \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

In what follows, an RL-based adaptive consensus tracking control strategy will be given for Eq. (7).

Step 1: From the definition of  $e_{i,1}$  in Eq. (2) and the dynamics of the follower,  $e_{i,1}(k+n_i) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} a_{i,j}(y_i(k+n_i) - y_j(k+n_i)) + a_{i,0}(y_i(k+n_i) - y_d(k+n_i))$ . We define  $e_{i,2}(k+n_i-1) = x_{i,2}(k+n_i-1) - \alpha_{i,2}(k)$ , where  $\alpha_{i,2}(k)$  is the virtual control law at this step, and will be determined later. From Eq. (7), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & e_{i,1}(k+n_i) \\ &= (d_i + a_{i,0})g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1)) \\ & \cdot \left[ \left( \frac{f_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} \right. \right. \\ & \quad \left. \left. - \frac{v_i y_j(k+n_i) + (1-v_i)y_d(k+n_i)}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} \right) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + v_i y_j(k+n_i) + (1-v_i)y_d(k+n_i) \right. \\ & \quad \left. - v_i y_j(k+n_i) - (1-v_i)y_d(k+n_i) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \alpha_{i,2}(k) + e_{i,2}(k+n_i-1) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where  $v_i = \frac{d_i}{d_i + a_{i,0}}$ . We denote  $\psi_{i,1}(k) = \frac{f_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} + \frac{v_i y_j(k+n_i) + (1-v_i)y_d(k+n_i)}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} - v_i y_j(k+n_i) - (1-v_i)y_d(k+n_i)$ .

According to the results in Section 3.1, for better information security, the transmitted signals are encrypted by the improved Liu encryption algorithm. Upon receiving the ciphertext, the signal is decrypted using the improved Liu decryption algorithm to obtain the desired message. There exists the following relationship between the true signal and the decrypted one:

$$\hat{z}_i(k) = y_i(k) - \hat{y}_i(k), \quad (9)$$

$$\hat{z}_d(k) = y_d(k) - \hat{y}_d(k), \quad (10)$$

where  $y_d(k)$  is the output information of the leader,  $\hat{z}_i(k)$  is the error between the output information

$y_i$  of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower and a decrypted information  $\hat{y}_i$ , and  $\hat{z}_d(k)$  is the error between the leader's output information  $y_d$  and the decrypted one  $\hat{y}_d$ . In fact,  $\hat{z}_i(k)$  and  $\hat{z}_d(k)$  are unknown and unpredictable for follower  $j$ . These errors are treated as unknown variables and are composed into unknown functions. According to Eqs. (9) and (10),  $\psi_{i,1}(k)$  is rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_{i,1}(k) &= - \frac{f_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} \\ & \quad + \frac{v_i(\hat{y}_j(k+n_i) + \hat{z}_j(k+n_i))}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} \\ & \quad + \frac{(1-v_i)(\hat{y}_d(k+n_i) + \hat{z}_d(k+n_i))}{g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1))} \\ & \quad - v_i(\hat{y}_j(k+n_i) + \hat{z}_j(k+n_i)) \\ & \quad - (1-v_i)(\hat{y}_d(k+n_i) + \hat{z}_d(k+n_i)). \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

Due to  $\psi_{i,1}(k)$  being an ideal value, it cannot be obtained. Using an actor NN to obtain the estimated value  $\psi_{i,1}(k) = (\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,1}(k)) + \varepsilon_{i,1}(k)$ , where  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^* \in \mathbb{R}^{\gamma_{i,1}}$  is the ideal weight vector,  $\gamma_{i,1}$  is the number of NN's nodes,  $\mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\cdot)$  is the NN basis function vector,  $\varepsilon_{i,1}(k)$  is the approximate error, and  $\mathbf{Z}_{i,1}(k) = [x_{i,1}(k+n_i-1), x_{i,2}(k+n_i-1), \dots, x_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1), \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \hat{y}_j(k+n_i), \hat{y}_d(k+n_i)]^T$ . Then, error (8) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} & e_{i,1}(k+n_i) \\ &= (d_i + a_{i,0})g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-1)) \\ & \cdot \left[ - (\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,1}(k)) - \varepsilon_{i,1}(k) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \alpha_{i,2}(k) + (\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k)) \right. \\ & \quad \left. - (\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k)) + e_{i,2}(k+n_i-1) \right. \\ & \quad \left. - v_i(\hat{y}_j(k+n_i) + \hat{z}_j(k+n_i)) - (1-v_i)(\hat{y}_d(k+n_i) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \hat{z}_d(k+n_i)) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

where  $\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k) = [x_{i,1}(k), \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \hat{y}_j(k), \hat{y}_d(k+n_i)]^T$ .

We design the virtual control law

$$\alpha_{i,2}(k) = \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k)) + v_i \hat{y}_j(k) + (1-v_i) \hat{y}_d(k+n_i) \quad (13)$$

with an adaptive update law

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}(k+1) &= \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}(k_{i,1}) - \mu_{i,1} \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k_{i,1})) \\ & \quad \cdot [\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}^T(k_{i,1}) \mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k_{i,1})) + \hat{\phi}_i(k)], \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

where  $\mu_{i,1}$  is a positive parameter,  $k_{i,1} = k - n_i + 1$ ,  $\hat{\theta}_{i,1}$  is the estimate of  $\theta_{i,1}^*$ , and  $\hat{\phi}_i(k)$  has been reported in Section 3.2.

Step  $l$  ( $2 \leq l \leq n_i - 1$ ): We define the  $l^{\text{th}}$  error as  $e_{i,l}(k + n_i + 1 - l) = x_{i,l}(k + n_i + 1 - l) - \alpha_{i,l}(k)$ , where  $\alpha_{i,l}(k)$  is the virtual control law at step  $l - 1$ .

With the dynamics of the follower in Eq. (1), we similarly denote  $\psi_{i,l}(k) = \frac{f_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-l))}{g_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-l))} + \frac{\alpha_{i,l}(k)}{g_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-l))} - \alpha_{i,l}(k)$ . We employ the NN approximation technique  $\psi_{i,l}(k) = (\theta_{i,l}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,l}(k)) + \varepsilon_{i,l}(k)$ , where  $\mathbf{Z}_{i,l}(k) = [x_{i,1}(k+n_i-l), x_{i,2}(k+n_i-l), \dots, x_{i,n_i}(k+n_i-l), \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \hat{y}_j(k+n_i), \hat{y}_d(k+n_i)]^T$ . From the signal analysis here, we substitute information from neighbors and/or the leader with the signals generated from the improved Liu cryptosystem instead of the real-time values in Bai et al. (2020b). This is one of key differences from the results in Bai et al. (2020b), and it arises owing to the requirement for privacy preservation. Then, the  $l^{\text{th}}$  error yields

$$\begin{aligned} e_{i,l}(k + n_i + 1 - l) &= g_{i,l}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k + n_i - l)) \left[ -(\theta_{i,l}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,l}(k)) \right. \\ &\quad + (\theta_{i,l}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k)) + e_{i,l+1}(k + n_i - l) \\ &\quad \left. - (\theta_{i,l}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k)) - \varepsilon_{i,l}(k) + \alpha_{i,l+1}(k) - \alpha_{i,l}(k) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where  $\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k) = [x_{i,1}(k), x_{i,2}(k), \dots, x_{i,l}(k), \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \hat{y}_j(k), \hat{y}_d(k + n_i)]^T$ ,  $e_{i,l+1}(k + n_i - l) = x_{i,l+1}(k + n_i - l) - \alpha_{i,l+1}(k)$  is the  $(l + 1)^{\text{th}}$  error, and  $\alpha_{i,l+1}(k)$  is the virtual control law at step  $l$ .

For stabilizing  $e_{i,l}$ , we design a virtual control law at this step

$$\alpha_{i,l+1}(k) = \hat{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k)) + \alpha_{i,l}(k), \quad (16)$$

with an adaptive update law

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\theta}_{i,l}(k + 1) &= \hat{\theta}_{i,l}(k_{i,l}) - \mu_{i,l} \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) \\ &\quad \cdot [\hat{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_{i,l}) \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) + \hat{\phi}_i(k)], \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

where  $\mu_{i,l}$  is a positive parameter,  $k_{i,l} = k - n_i + l$ , and  $\hat{\theta}_{i,l}$  is the estimate of  $\theta_{i,l}^*$ .

Step  $n_i$ : We define the  $n_i^{\text{th}}$  error variable  $e_{i,n_i}(k + 1) = x_{i,n_i}(k + 1) - \alpha_{i,n_i}(k)$ . This error

becomes

$$\begin{aligned} e_{i,n_i}(k + 1) &= g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) \left[ \left( \frac{f_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))}{g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))} \right. \right. \\ &\quad \left. \left. - \frac{\alpha_{i,n_i-1}(k)}{g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))} + \alpha_{i,n_i-1}(k) \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + u_i(k) - \alpha_{i,n_i}(k) \right] + \varpi_i(k), \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

where  $\alpha_{i,n_i}(k)$  is the virtual control law at step  $n_i - 1$ .

We denote an unknown function  $\psi_{i,n_i}(k) = -\frac{f_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))}{g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))} + \frac{\alpha_{i,n_i}(k)}{g_{i,n_i}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))} - \alpha_{i,n_i}(k)$ , and an actor NN is employed to approximate this unknown function  $\psi_{i,n_i}(k) = (\theta_{i,n_i}^*)^T \mathbf{S}_{i,n_i}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,n_i}(k)) + \varepsilon_{i,n_i}(k)$ , where  $\mathbf{Z}_{i,n_i}(k) = [x_{i,1}(k), x_{i,2}(k), \dots, x_{i,n_i}(k), \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \hat{y}_j(k), \hat{y}_d(k + n_i)]^T$ .

Then the final control law is designed:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(k) &= -\check{c}_{i,1} \check{e}_{i,1}(k) - \sum_{l=2}^{n_i} \check{c}_{i,l} e_{i,l}(k) \\ &\quad + \hat{\theta}_{i,n_i}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,n_i}(\mathbf{h}_{i,n_i}(k)) + \alpha_{i,n_i}(k), \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

with an adaptive update law

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\theta}_{i,n_i}(k + 1) &= \hat{\theta}_{i,n_i}(k_{n_i}) - \mu_{i,n_i} \mathbf{S}_{i,n_i}(\mathbf{h}_{i,n_i}(k_{n_i})) \\ &\quad \cdot [\hat{\theta}_{i,n_i}^T(k_{n_i}) \mathbf{S}_{i,n_i}(\mathbf{h}_{i,n_i}(k_{n_i})) + \hat{\phi}_i(k)], \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

where  $\check{c}_{i,l}$  is a control gain,  $\mu_{i,n_i}$  is a positive parameter,  $k_{n_i} = k$ ,  $\hat{\theta}_{i,n_i}$  is the estimate of  $\theta_{i,n_i}^*$ , and  $\mathbf{h}_{i,n_i}(k) = \mathbf{Z}_{i,n_i}(k)$ .

The block diagram of the overall MAS is shown in Fig. 4, where the output signals of the leader and followers are connected through a directed communication topology, and the strategy is constructed with the use of privacy-preserving information received from neighboring followers. In the MAS, the encryption and decryption processes are for transmission information, critic NNs use synchronization errors as a reward and punishment for a utility function, and actor NNs use approximation of a utility function for  $u_i$  recursively. The diagram of the proposed strategy for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower is shown in Fig. 5.

**Remark 4** The dynamics of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower (1) comprises  $n_i$  subsystems. There exists an issue in selecting virtual control laws  $\alpha_{i,2}(k) = -[f_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) - y_d(k+1)]/g_{i,1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))$  and  $\alpha_{i,3}(k) = -[f_{i,2}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k)) - \alpha_{i,2}(k+1)]/g_{i,2}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{i,n_i}(k))$  for stabilization. While  $\alpha_{i,2}(k)$  stabilizes the first subsystem,  $\alpha_{i,3}(k)$  stabilizes the second subsystem. However,  $\alpha_{i,2}(k + 1)$  represents a future virtual control law






Fig. 4 Block diagram of the multi-agent system (MAS)




Fig. 5 Block diagram of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower

that is not yet available, and  $\alpha_{i,3}(k)$  is infeasible. To address this issue, the dynamics of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  follower is transformed into a specific form of Eq. (7). The transformation allows us to treat the original follower as a one-step predictor, transforming it into an equivalent maximum  $n_i$ -step predictor. Thereafter,  $\alpha_{i,3}(k)$ , as well as the virtual control signals arising in pursuance, becomes feasible. More details can be found in Ge SS et al. (2003).

**Remark 5** In our strategy, an improved Liu cryptosystem is introduced, which encrypts the information transmitted among agents and preserves privacy. The differences between our strategy and the one based on the existing RL method in Bai et al. (2020b) can be stated from the points of view of the following three perspectives: the construction of the utility function, the analysis of error dynamics, and the design of control laws. The control strategy based on the existing RL method uses real information, while our strategy employs decrypted information for privacy preservation.

### 4 Stability analysis

Here, the stability is analyzed. The main results are summarized in the following theorem:

**Theorem 1** For a nonstrict-feedback nonlinear MAS with the leader and followers (1) under Assumption 1, the RL-based adaptive consensus tracking control strategy with a privacy-preserving method consists of the virtual control laws (13) and (16), the parameter update laws (6), (14), (17), and (20), and the control law (19). If the design parameters satisfy  $0 < \beta_i < 1$ ,  $0 < \mu_{i,\phi} < 1/(\beta_i^2 \gamma_{i,\phi})$ ,  $0 < \mu_{i,l} < 1/\gamma_{i,l}$ , and  $\check{c}_{i,l} > 0$ , the RL-based control strategy with the privacy-preserving method ensures that all signals in the closed-loop system are ultimately bounded and that the consensus tracking error of the MAS achieves consensus tracking.

**Proof** Substituting Eqs. (13), (16), and (19) into Eqs. (12), (15), and (18) at instant  $k+1$ , respectively, we have the following error dynamics:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & e_{i,1}(k+1) \\
 = & (d_i + a_{i,0})g_{i,1}(\bar{x}_{i,n_i}(k)) \left[ -\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^T(k_{i,1})\mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,1}(k_{i,1})) \right. \\
 & + \boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^T(k_{i,1})\mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k_{i,1})) - \varepsilon_{i,1}(k_{i,1}) \\
 & \left. + e_{i,2}(k) - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}^T(k_{i,1})\mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k_{i,1})) \right], \tag{21}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & e_{i,l}(k+1) \\
 = & g_{i,1}(\bar{x}_{i,n_i}(k)) \left[ -\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_{i,l})\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) \right. \\
 & - \varepsilon_{i,l}(k_{i,l}) + \boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_{i,l})\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) \\
 & \left. - \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}^T(k_{i,l})\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) + e_{i,l}(k) \right], \tag{22}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 e_{i,n_i}(k+1) = & g_{i,n}(\bar{x}_{i,n_i}(k)) \left[ \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,n_i}^T(k)\mathbf{S}_{i,n_i}(\mathbf{h}_{i,n_i}(k)) \right. \\
 & \left. - \varepsilon_{i,n_i}(k) - \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} \check{c}_{i,l}e_{i,l} \right] + \varpi_i(k), \tag{23}
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}(k) = \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}(k) - \boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,1}^*$ ,  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}(k) = \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}(k) - \boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,l}^*$ , and  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,n_i}(k) = \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,n_i}(k) - \boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,n_i}^*$ .

Consider a Lyapunov function as follows:

$$V(k) = V_1(k) + V_2(k), \tag{24}$$

where  $V_1(k) = \frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4}e_{i,1}^2(k) + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \frac{\omega_{e,l}}{4}e_{i,l}^2(k) + \frac{\omega_{e,n_i}}{n_i+3}e_{i,n_i}^2(k)$ ,  $V_2(k) = \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} \frac{\omega_{\theta,l}}{\mu_{i,l}} \sum_{\epsilon=0}^{n_i-l} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}^T(k_l + \epsilon)\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,l}(k_l + \epsilon) + \frac{\omega_{\phi}}{\mu_{i,\phi}}\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,\phi}^T(k)\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,\phi}(k) + 6\omega_{\phi}[\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,\phi}^T(k-1)\mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k-1)]^2$ ,  $\omega_{\phi} > 0$ ,  $\omega_{\theta,l} > 0$ , and  $\omega_{e,l} > 0$ .

With Young's inequality and the inequality  $0 < \mathbf{S}_{i,l}^T(\cdot)\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\cdot) \leq \gamma_{i,l}$  from the property in the radial basis function (RBF) NN, we obtain

$$-\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,l}^T\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{Z}_{i,l}(k_l)) + \boldsymbol{\theta}_{i,l}^T\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_l)) \leq \bar{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}^2 + \gamma_{i,l}, \tag{25}$$

where  $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i - 1$ .

By Eq. (21) and inequality (25) and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality  $(\chi_1 + \chi_2 + \dots + \chi_n)^2 \leq n(\chi_1^2 + \chi_2^2 + \dots + \chi_n^2)$ , where  $\chi_m \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $m = 1, 2, \dots, n$ , we deduce the forward difference of  $V_1(k)$  as

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Delta V_1(k) & \leq (d_i + a_{i,0})^2 \omega_{e,1} \bar{g}_{i,1}^2 \left( \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}^T(k_{i,1})\mathbf{S}_{i,1}(\mathbf{h}_{i,1}(k_{i,1})) \right)^2 \\
 & + (d_i + a_{i,0})^2 \omega_{e,1} \bar{g}_{i,1}^2 e_{i,2}^2(k) + (d_i + a_{i,0})^2 \omega_{e,1} \bar{g}_{i,1}^2 \bar{\varepsilon}_{i,1}^2 \\
 & + (d_i + a_{i,0})^2 \omega_{e,1} \bar{g}_{i,1}^2 (\bar{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,1}^2 + \gamma_{i,1})^2 - \frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4} e_{i,1}^2(k) \\
 & + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 \left( \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}^T(k_{i,l})\mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) \right)^2 \\
 & + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 e_{i,l+1}^2(k) + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 \bar{\varepsilon}_{i,l}^2 \\
 & + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 (\bar{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i,l}^2 + \gamma_{i,l})^2 - \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \frac{\omega_{e,l}}{4} e_{i,l}^2(k)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & + \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,n_i}^T(k_{n_i}) \mathbf{S}_{i,n_i}(\mathbf{h}_{i,n_i}(k_{n_i})) \right)^2 \\
 & + \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} \check{c}_{i,l}^2 e_{i,l}^2 - \frac{\omega_{e,n_i}}{n+3} e_{i,n_i}^2(k) \\
 & + \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \bar{c}_{i,n_i}^2 + \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{\omega}_i^2.
 \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

From Eqs. (14), (17), and (20), combining the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality and the inequality  $0 < \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}^T(\cdot) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(\cdot) \leq \gamma_{i,\phi}$ , the forward difference of  $V_2(k)$  is obtained as

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Delta V_2(k) \\
 & \leq - \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} \omega_{\theta,l} (1 - \mu_{i,l} \gamma_{i,l}) \left( \hat{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_l) \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_l)) \right) \\
 & + \hat{\phi}_i(k)^2 - \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} \omega_{\theta,l} \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_l) \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_l)) \right)^2 \\
 & + \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} 2\omega_{\theta,l} \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k) \right)^2 \\
 & + \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} 2\omega_{\theta,l} \left( \frac{1}{2} \bar{\theta}_{i,l}^2 + \gamma_{i,l} + \frac{1}{2} \bar{\theta}_{i,\phi}^2 \right) \\
 & - \omega_{\phi} (1 - \mu_{i,\phi} \beta_i^2 \gamma_{i,\phi}) \left( \beta_i \hat{\phi}_i(k) - \hat{\phi}_i(k-1) \right) \\
 & + \zeta_i(k)^2 + 6\omega_{\phi} \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k-1) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k-1) \right)^2 + 3\omega_{\phi} \\
 & + \frac{3}{4} \omega_{\phi} (2 + \beta_i^2) \left( \bar{\theta}_{i,\phi}^2 + \gamma_{i,\phi} \right) - \omega_{\phi} \beta_i^2 \\
 & \cdot \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k) \right)^2 + 6\omega_{\phi} \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k) \right)^2 \\
 & - 6\omega_{\phi} \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k-1) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k-1) \right)^2.
 \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

From inequalities (26) and (27), by selecting the parameters  $\mu_{i,l}$  and  $\mu_{i,\phi}$  satisfying  $0 < \mu_{i,l} \leq 1/\gamma_{i,l}$  and  $0 < \mu_{i,\phi} \leq 1/(\beta_i^2 \gamma_{i,\phi})$  respectively, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Delta V(k) \\
 & \leq - \sum_{l=1}^{n_i-2} \left( \frac{\omega_{e,l+1}}{4} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,l+1}^2 - \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 \right) e_{i,l+1}^2(k) \\
 & - \left( \frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,1}^2 \right) e_{i,1}^2(k) - \left( \frac{\omega_{e,n_i}}{n+3} \right. \\
 & \left. - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,n_i}^2 - \omega_{e,n_i-1} \bar{g}_{i,n_i-1}^2 \right) e_{i,n_i}^2 \\
 & - \left( \omega_{\phi} \beta_i^2 - \sum_{l=1}^2 2\omega_{\theta,l} - 6\omega_{\phi} \right) \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k) \right)^2 \\
 & - \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} (\omega_{\theta,l} - \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2) \left( \tilde{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_{i,l}) \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_{i,l})) \right)^2 + D,
 \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

where  $D = \sum_{l=1}^{n_i} 2\omega_{\theta,l} \left( \frac{1}{2} \bar{\theta}_{i,l}^2 + \gamma_{i,l} + \frac{1}{2} \bar{\theta}_{i,\phi}^2 \right)^2 + 3\omega_{\phi} + \frac{3}{4} \omega_{\phi} (2 + \beta_i^2) \left( \bar{\theta}_{i,\phi}^2 + \gamma_{i,\phi} \right)^2 + \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{\omega}_i^2 + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i-1} \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 \left( \bar{\theta}_{i,l}^2 + \gamma_{i,l} \right)^2 + (d_i + a_{i,0})^2 \omega_{e,1} \bar{g}_{i,1}^2 \bar{c}_{i,1}^2 + (d_i + a_{i,0})^2 \omega_{e,1} \bar{g}_{i,1}^2 \left( \bar{\theta}_{i,1}^2 + \gamma_{i,1} \right)^2 + \sum_{l=2}^{n_i} \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2 \bar{c}_{i,l}^2$ .

We choose parameters such as  $\frac{\omega_{e,l+1}}{4} > \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,l+1}^2 + \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2$ ,  $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i - 2$ ,  $\frac{\omega_{e,n_i}}{n+3} > \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,n_i}^2 + \omega_{e,n_i-1} \bar{g}_{i,n_i-1}^2$ ,  $\omega_{\phi} \beta_i^2 > \sum_{l=1}^2 2\omega_{\theta,l} + 6\omega_{\phi}$ ,  $\omega_{\theta,l} > \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2$ ,  $\frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4} > \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,1}^2$ . It is concluded that  $\Delta V(k) < 0$  as long as  $|e_{i,l+1}(k)| > \frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{\omega_{e,l+1}}{4} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,l+1}^2 - \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2}}$  ( $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i - 2$ ),  $|e_{i,n_i}(k)| > \frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{\omega_{e,n_i}}{n+3} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,n_i}^2 - \omega_{e,n_i-1} \bar{g}_{i,n_i-1}^2}}$ ,  $|e_{i,1}(k)| > \frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,1}^2}}$ ,  $|\tilde{\theta}_{i,\phi}^T(k) \mathbf{S}_{i,\phi}(k)| > \frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\omega_{\phi} \beta_i^2 - \sum_{l=1}^2 2\omega_{\theta,l} - 6\omega_{\phi}}}$ , and  $|\tilde{\theta}_{i,l}^T(k_l) \mathbf{S}_{i,l}(\mathbf{h}_{i,l}(k_l))| > \frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\omega_{\theta,l} - \omega_{e,l} \bar{g}_{i,l}^2}}$ ,  $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i$ .

Now we are going to present the bound for consensus tracking error in the MAS. From the stability analysis,  $e_{i,1}(k)$  converges to  $\frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,1}^2}}$ . According to Eq. (3) and Assumption 2, we obtain  $\mathbf{e} = \mathcal{H}^{-1} \mathbf{e}_1$  (Zhang HG et al., 2017). Then, the norm of the output consensus tracking error  $\|\mathbf{e}\|$  converges to  $\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\sqrt{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{\omega_{e,1}}{4} - \omega_{e,n_i} \bar{g}_{i,n_i}^2 \check{c}_{i,1}^2}}} / \sigma_{\min}(\mathcal{H})}$ , where  $\sigma_{\min}(\mathcal{H})$  is the minimum singular value of  $\mathcal{H}$ . The errors in the MAS as well as other signals in the closed-loop system are ultimately bounded. The proof is completed.

The guideline for the selection of parameters in the RL-based control strategy with a privacy-preserving method is given as follows:

1. Select parameters  $0 < \sigma < 1$ ,  $0 < \beta_i < 1$ , and  $0 < \mu_{i,\phi} < 1/(\beta_i^2 \gamma_{i,\phi})$ . Determine the utility function (4), the long-term policy utility function (5), and the update law  $\hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}(k)$ .
2. Choose the parameter  $0 < \mu_{i,l} < 1/\gamma_{i,l}$  and determine the virtual control laws  $\alpha_{i,l}(k)$  with update laws for  $\hat{\theta}_{i,l}(k)$  ( $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i$ ).
3. By selecting control parameters  $\check{c}_{i,l} > 0$  ( $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_i$ ) and  $0 < \mu_{i,n_i} < 1/\gamma_{i,n_i}$ , the control law  $u_i(k)$  with an update law for  $\hat{\theta}_{i,n_i}(k)$  is determined.

### 5 Simulation examples

To demonstrate the feasibility of the theoretical claims, two simulation examples are given. In this

section, the two MASs both consist of one leader and four followers, and there exists the risk of privacy disclosure over communication topology. Fig. 6 shows the communication topology.




Fig. 6 Communication graph in Examples 1 and 2

**Example 1** Consider the four followers in Eq. (1):

$$\begin{cases} x_{i,1}(k+1) = f_{i,1}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k)) + g_{i,1}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k))x_{i,2}(k), \\ x_{i,2}(k+1) = f_{i,2}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k)) + g_{i,2}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k))u_i(k) + \varpi_i(k), \\ y_i(k) = x_{i,1}(k), \end{cases} \quad (29)$$

where  $f_{i,1}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k)) = -x_{i,1}(k) \triangleq T$ ,  $f_{i,2}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k)) = [-x_{i,2}(k) + 3.1(0.4 - x_{i,1}(k)) \exp(\frac{1.5x_{i,2}(k)}{3.4+x_{i,2}(k)})] \triangleq T$ ,  $g_{i,1}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k)) = \frac{1}{x_{i,2}(k)} [0.019(1.5 + 0.01x_{i,1}^2(k)) \exp(\frac{4x_{i,2}(k)}{3.4+x_{i,2}(k)})] \triangleq T$ ,  $g_{i,2}(\bar{x}_{i,2}(k)) = 4.1(1.001 + \sin(x_{i,1}(k)x_{i,2}(k))) \triangleq T$ ,  $\varpi_i(k) = 0.05 \cos(0.05k) \cos(x_{i,1}(k))$ , and  $\Delta T$  is the sampling time.

The reference signal is given by  $y_d = 0.006 \sin(\pi/8 + 0.6\pi t/38) + 0.0365$ . The centers of the RBF NN for  $\phi_i(k)$ ,  $\psi_{i,1}(k)$ , and  $\psi_{i,2}(k)$  are uniformly spaced in  $[-2 \times 2] \times [-2 \times 2] \times [-2 \times 2]$  with width  $\eta = \sqrt{2}$ . The index threshold is chosen as  $\sigma = 0.0002$ . The initial state values are  $x_{1,1}(0) = 0.09$ ,  $x_{2,1}(0) = 0.095$ ,  $x_{3,1}(0) = 0.12$ ,  $x_{4,1}(0) = 0.1$ ,  $x_{i,2}(0) = 0.5$ ,  $\hat{\theta}_{i,\phi}(0) = [0.003, 0.003, \dots, 0.003]_{50 \times 1}^T$ ,  $\hat{\theta}_{i,1}(0) = [0.0003, 0.0003, \dots, 0.0003]_{50 \times 1}^T$ , and  $\hat{\theta}_{i,2}(0) = [0.0003, 0.0003, \dots, 0.0003]_{50 \times 1}^T$ . Other control parameters are  $\beta_i = 0.00001$ ,  $\mu_{i,\phi} = 0.02$ ,  $\mu_{i,1} = 0.5$ ,  $\mu_{i,2} = 0.2$ ,  $\check{c}_{i,1} = 120$ , and  $\check{c}_{i,2} = 0.2$ .

Due to the sensitivity of the output information from both leaders and followers, it is necessary to encrypt this information before communication interaction among agents. The simulation results are displayed in Figs. 7–11. The curves of the leader and followers are plotted in Fig. 7. The control inputs




Fig. 7  $y_i$  ( $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ ) and  $y_d$  in Example 1




Fig. 8 Control inputs in Example 1


are plotted in Fig. 8. In Fig. 9, the output information of follower 4 is presented, which is similar with ciphertext after being decrypted by the improved Liu decryption algorithm, and the encrypted information during the transmission process is also provided. From Fig. 10, we observe that the decryption error associated with our improved Liu cryptosystem is smaller than that arising pursuant to using the algorithm from Liu DX (2013). For an intuitive comparison, we take the leader as an example. As seen from Fig. 11, the amplified plaintext is able to better restore the truth value after decryption.

**Example 2** Marine surface vessels are taken as another example.


The details of Example 2 are provided in the supplementary materials.

## 6 Conclusions


An RL-based privacy-preserving consensus tracking control strategy with improved Liu



**Fig. 9** Relevant information and ciphertext of follower 4 in Example 1



**Fig. 10** Comparison of follower 4's decryption errors with different methods in Example 1



**Fig. 11** Comparison of decryption signals of the leader with different methods in Example 1

cryptosystem has been proposed for a nonstrict-feedback discrete-time MAS. We observe that the improved Liu cryptosystem encrypts the information transmitted among agents and thus effectively prevents the possibility of intrusion of external information. With the help of a Lyapunov function, the

proposed control strategy has guaranteed that all signals are ultimately bounded and that the output consensus errors of the MAS converge to a neighborhood around the origin. This control strategy is only for nonstrict-feedback MASs, and it is not applicable to non-affine ones (Wang SB, 2022), MASs with state (Liu L et al., 2022), output constraints (Liu L et al., 2021; Lin et al., 2022), or input saturation (Zhang JX et al., 2021). Therefore, our further work will focus on general MASs with both state and output constraints, concomitant with fulfilling the priority of privacy preservation.

## Contributors

Yang YANG, Fanning HUANG, and Dong YUE designed the research. Yang YANG and Fanning HUANG processed the data and drafted the paper. Dong YUE helped organize the paper. Yang YANG and Fanning HUANG revised and finalized the paper.

## Conflict of interest

All the authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

## Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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## List of supplementary materials

- 1 Example 2
- Fig. S1 Output consensus tracking performance of  $\check{x}_i$ ,  $\check{y}_i$ , and  $\check{\psi}_i$  in Example 2
- Fig. S2 Two-dimensional output consensus tracking in Example 2
- Fig. S3 Comparison of follower 2's decryption errors with different methods in Example 2