

HEGEL'S THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE REAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract: Hegel's practical philosophy must not be underestimated. The basis of practical philosophy was established only after Hegel understood consciousness as self-consciousness and expounded and proved the constitution of self-consciousness, i. e. found the intersubjective structure in self-consciousness.

Key words: Hegel, self-consciousness, intersubjectivity, practical philosophy

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INTRODUCTION

Aristotle laid the foundation of traditional practical philosophy, which focuses on the concept of human praxis-action and inquires further into the essence and grounds of human freedom, punctuated in modern philosophy, because of epistemology's change of direction. German classical philosophy reconstructed practical philosophy's prior position and carried over its ancient tradition. Kant founded transcendental logic, which distinguishes the sphere of freedom (i. e. social sphere) from that of nature. Furthermore, he proposed that practical reason is a higher aspect of theoretical reason. Both reflect his significant role in the revival of practical philosophy. On the other hand, Hegel developed practical philosophy to an extreme by criticizing Kant's practical philosophy. Kant stripped pure self-consciousness and emphasized the autonomy and subjectivity of moral consciousness, Hegel, in his theory of self-consciousness, established the principle of intersubjectivity, emphasized the synthesis of reason and history and made intersubjectivity the key idea of his practical philosophy. Hegel's transcendence over Kant had been neglected for a long time: People even often thought that Kant's philosophy was superior to that of Hegel and criticized Hegel's philosophy (as inferior to that of Kant).

This underestimation of Hegel's practical philosophy is being changed in contemporary thinking. By studying Hegel's theory of self-consciousness, I try to prove in this paper that the basis of practical philosophy is established only after Hegel understood consciousness as self-consciousness and expounded and proved the constitution of self-consciousness, i. e., found the intersubjective structure in self-consciousness.

CRITIQUE OF SUBJECTIVE PHILOSOPHY

In lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel pointed out that the philosophy of modern times proceeds from the standpoint of actual self-consciousness (Hegel, 1955, p. 159). In "Philosophy of Right", He said that the theory of freedom must begin with the nature of self-consciousness (Hegel, 1967). This shows that Hegel's theory of self-consciousness is the starting point of his concept of freedom, meanwhile, it is the speculative summarization and critique of the modern philosophical process.

Modern philosophy is subjective philosophy. The founder of modern philosophy, Descartes, thought that "I think, therefore I am" is the absolute basis of all philosophies. "By this philosophy is at one stroke transplanted to quite another field and to quite another standpoint, namely to the sphere of subjectivity." (Hegel, 1955, p. 228) This is the change of direction of the epis-

temology of modern philosophy. Thinking is the principle of philosophy. Self, i. e., thinking subject or knowing subject, becomes the precondition of epistemology. Hegel pointed out, "Fichte did later on," "Fichte first applied himself to the deduction of all determinations from this culminating point of absolute certainty." (Hegel, 1955, p. 228; 230) It is thus evident that what modern philosophy, from Descartes to Fichte, establishes is preexistent certainty of self-consciousness as subject and it completely denies that self-consciousness also has presupposition and precondition.

Thus, Hegel must criticize modern subjective philosophy so as to advance self-understanding of man. For him, the scheme from the stand of real self-consciousness in modern times is unfinished and needs to go on and have a new try: He explored the formation of self-consciousness. If expressed in Descartes' way, Hegel's genealogical exploration of such self-consciousness as "I think, therefore I am; but what am I?" makes up the fundamental omission of modern philosophers.

Of course, when modern philosophy is summed up as Cartesianism, it is only an approximate generalization. In fact, in modern philosophy, a process of self-criticism and self-development, which has great influence on Hegel to realize his decisive turn, also exists. Here we must talk about Hume, Kant and Fichte particularly.

Because Descartes' "thought has properly speaking grasped itself as abstract understanding only, in relation to which the more concrete content still stands over on the other side, the determinate conceptions are not yet deduced from the understanding, but taken up only empirically". (Hegel, 1955, p. 224) Also because of this, Descartes, emphasis on subjectivity shows that modern philosophers try to find an undoubted startingpoint so as to get more reliable "objective" knowledge, at the same time, it contains a division of "thinking substance" and "extensive matter" or knowing "subject" and "object". It is this kind of division that constitutes the main clue of all modern philosophies. Taylor held that Descartes' dualism "develops to its full form through Locke and Enlightenment thinks he influenced", "it becomes what I want to call the 'punctual' self" (Taylor, 1989). Concerning

this "punctual" view of self, individual experience constitutes individual and self is self-confirmed through experience. Hume sharply criticized this picture of man. With totally empirical stand, he affirms that all the formulations that think of self as ultimate precondition, "are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them". "It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression" (Hume, 1999).

Hume proved the impossibility of the concept of self with totally empirical stand, so Hegel says with happiness that "Hume really completed the system of Locke" (Hegel, 1955, p. 371). Kantian philosophy, which starts from that of Hume, then gets the concept of transcendental self by deduction to answer Hume's challenges and questions. Kant wholly agreed that there are no necessity and universality in perception, i. e. external things. He recognized that necessity and universality, such as mathematics and natural science do exist. However, where to look for them? Kant thought that since necessity and universality do not exist in external things, they must a prior belong to thinking. People's thinking has a form that brings about unity of different materials. This unity is "self" and the apperception of self-consciousness. The apperception is a kind of behavior that seeks ability, (other than perception which means feeling, representation) through which something can be shot in self-consciousness. Self is the utterly general, sheer unstipulated, most abstract thing. Self exercises the function of the apperception, which means putting an experiential content into consciousness of self. A content in the consciousness becomes the content of self. Kant calls the specific form that brings about unity of different materials as category. The transcendental nature of these categories lies in considering self as unity of different representations and experiential materials, but, as far as these categories are concerned, they are void and without any content. Some materials are needed to substantiate these categories. Content is given to us with sensuousness, perception, direct seeing, feeling etc. The content as diversified materials are tied by means of understanding the self and synthesized through transcendental apperception of self. Thus, self is summed up as transcendental unity of perception. It is the transcendental basis of necessity,

universality and thing-in-itself. Meanwhile, it is the real, synthetic a priori judgement.

But, just as Hegel pointed out, "the knowing subject does not with Kant really arrive at reason". "As a matter of fact there is described in what we have seen only the empirical finite self-consciousness which requires a material from outside, or which is limited." (Hegel, 1955, p. 443) Kant held that experience can only grasp phenomenon and the knowledge that we gain from experience cannot uncover the true features of a thing, so the movement and function of self can never get to the other shore.

Then, what is Fichte's contribution in criticizing and advancing the modern view of self? Seen from the starting point, Fichte emphasized that philosophy must begin with an absolutely unconditioned, certain principle. It cannot be proved or defined. The basis of the theory of knowledge is the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Ego is Ego, I am I. This makes us recollect that the meaning of "I think, therefore I am" lies in pointing out the transcendental unity of self-consciousness and attempting to develop the whole content of consciousness from it consistently and scientifically. All should be inferred from self. Kant's means of enumerating scope should be cancelled. Concerning this "his philosophy is the Kantian philosophy in its completion". (Hegel, 1955, p. 479) Yet, what Hegel thought more highly of is that Fichte set up the other side or the other thing which is different from the absolute self-consciousness for self-consciousness. After advancing the first principle "Ego = Ego", he advanced the second principle: "I assert a non-ego in opposition to the ego." This means that "self-consciousness refuses any longer to regard absolute essence as immediate substance which does not in itself possess difference, reality, and actuality". (Hegel, 1955, p. 482) Fichtian philosophy is beyond abstract metaphysical thoughts. But the shortcoming of Fichtian philosophy is thus firstly that "the ego retains the significance of the individual, actual self-consciousness, as opposed to that which is universal or absolute, or to the spirit in which it is itself a moment merely; for the individual self-consciousness simply signifies standing apart as far as another is concerned". (Hegel, 1955, p. 499) Thus, when "we should expect Fichte to demonstrate the return of other-be-

ing into absolute consciousness", this return does not come to pass. (Hegel, 1955, p. 491 - 492) The non-ego becomes resistance of the ego. That's to say, "non-ego" exists as otherness in Fichte's theory of knowledge, so Fichte did not fully realize the significance of the concept of "non-ego" as a transcendence over Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" and Leibnitz's closed monad as "a = A". "Fichte does not attain to the idea of Reason as the perfected, real unity of subject and object, or of ego and non-ego; it is only, as with Kant, represented as the thought of a union in a belief or faith, The knowledge of absolute unity is apprehended as faith in a moral disposition of the world." So Fichte's philosophy is still called "formal" by Hegel (Hegel, 1955, p. 499 - 500).

In brief, the principle of modern philosophy is the view of real self-consciousness, but the formation of self-consciousness is totally omitted. Modern philosophers, from Descartes to Fichte, all cannot realize that self, which is looked upon as absolute precondition of epistemology by them, is a social creation originally. "I", "I think" is not the precondition, but the result. In order to rectify the deviation, Hegel develops the genealogical problem of self-consciousness comprehensively by introducing the concept of "the other". For Hegel, it is correct for Hume to point out that self cannot be found in perception. But the problem is that self should not be searched after in perception, but in "the other". Although Kant tried to deduce transcendental self, it is only experience as such and it does not touch upon the other's experience, so Kantian philosophy still belongs to the tradition of Cartesianism or it exerts subjectivity to the highest peak. Fichte sets up the other side ("non-ego") for self and points out that it is significant for self to prove itself through life struggle. But what Fichte emphasized was otherness of the other, the whole process of his theory of knowledge starts from self and deduces from some determinations to others. However, these determinations cannot return to unity. It is thus obvious that it is a decisive turn for Hegel to advance the concept of "the other".

THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

In "The Phenomenology of Geist", Hegel

collectively explored the nature of self-consciousness by use of the concept of "the other". In the first three chapters of "The Phenomenology of Geist", Hegel revealed that starting from "sensual certainty" or "understanding", there is no way to reach self-consciousness. "To reach it, one must start from something other than contemplative knowledge of Being, other than its passive revelation, which leaves Being as it is in itself, independent of the knowledge that reveals it." (Kojève, 1969) In other words, in order to get self-consciousness, premises and preconditions are needed. In the beginning of Chapter 4 of "The Phenomenology of Geist", Hegel spoke of desires. For him, the basis of self-consciousness is not the passive, sheer thinking actions, but the active desires that are in negation. Desires are indeducible, but if they are established, the nature of self-consciousness can be realized. For Hegel, self-consciousness is Desire, self-consciousness is thus only assured of itself through sublating this other, which is presented to self-consciousness as an independent life, self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. In this state of satisfactions, self-consciousness has experience of the independence of its object. Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the gratification of desire, are conditioned by the object; for the certainty exists through cancelling this other; in order that this cancelling may be effected, there must be this other. (Hegel, 1999, p. 225 - 226) Only the other, i. e. the other self-consciousness exists and interacts with it can self-consciousness come into being. That is to say, the nature of self-consciousness is the unity of its duality. Self-consciousness has another self-consciousness that is antagonistic to it. "Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other." (Hegel, 1999, p. 229) To do so, the motionless tautology, I am I, becomes I am the other. Meanwhile, self-consciousness must cancel this. Its other, in order thereby become certain of itself as a true being. It thereupon proceeds to sublimate its own self, for this other is itself. Therefore,

this sublation means a return. The formation of self-consciousness "is absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as itself; Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both". (Hegel, 1999, p. 230)

The reason why self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself is that "it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized' ". (Hegel, 1999, p. 229) Contrary to modern subjective philosophy and the individualist ideology in which "the other" has never been mentioned, or it is mentioned only as the burden and menace of self, Hegel thought that self comes into being in relational movement with the other. "They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another". (Hegel, 1999, p. 231) Recognition is the nuclear concept in the unity of the duality of self-consciousness. If self-consciousness only exists for itself, is equal to itself by excluding all the other sides from itself, just as Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" and Fichte's "I am I" mean, the situation in which an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an individual will appear because the other side is also a self-consciousness. As we know, it is this kind of understanding that results in Hobbes' political philosophy, but in Hegel's view, this kind of self-consciousness is not real self-consciousness. These forms of consciousness "have not yet revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for themselves, i. e., as self-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth". According to Hegel's notion of recognition, it is not possible that self-consciousness is understood as this pure certainty of itself, "except in the form that as the other is for it, so it is for the other; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other achieves this pure abstraction of existence for self". (Hegel, 1999, p. 232)

But the further question is that there are many desires, which require to be recognized generally. "The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle." (Hegel, 1999, p. 232) But, if every struggle to guard the dignity will at

least end with the death of one side, at last only one person is left in the world. According to the concept of recognition, the last person is not true human being any more. Thus, the struggle for recognition will result in that "one is merely recognized, while the other only recognizes" (Hegel, 1999, p. 231). Is Hegel's explanatory model, i. e. self is equal to reciprocal recognition valid? Hegel analyses the question with an example of lordship and bondage.

He pointed out that the appearance of the relation between lordship and bondage is the result of the struggle for recognition. But in this relation, the self of the master is forced to recognize the existence of the other self (the bondsman) and he does not admit the bondsman into his world at once. He does not destroy the bondsman to death, instead, he destroys the independent self of the bondsman so as to make him be absolutely dependent. Hegel held that the unequal relation between the master and the bondsman cannot make them reach real self-consciousness and what they get is only bondage's ideology. He says that "having a 'mind of its own' is simply stubbornness, a type of freedom which does not get beyond the attitude of bondage." (Hegel, 1999, p. 240) Stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness are the expression of the bondage's ideologies.

Then, how is self-consciousness of reciprocal recognition deduced? Hegel pointed out that by appearance the master is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the bondsman is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another. (Hegel, 1999, p. 234) However, the master, as a consciousness for itself, is not only a concept for itself any more. It integrates with itself through another consciousness, i. e. bondage's ideology, whose nature is a general thing. Consequently, the master is connected with two links. On one hand, it is connected with a thing that is the object of desire; on the other hand, it is connected with bondage's consciousness whose essential character is thinghood.

Here, at first, the master is connected with both sides directly, then, it is connected with each side through both sides indirectly. On one hand, the master is connected with the master through things indirectly, for it is in this relation that the bondsman becomes a bondsman. Only in

the form of a thing can the bondsman be independent, but the master is capable of governing things, so, for the bondsman, things are negative and they are chains from which he is unable to break loose in the struggle. On the other hand, the master relates to things indirectly through the bondsman. The bondsman, as general self-consciousness also has negative relations with things and he can sublimate things. The bondsman puts his self-consciousness onto things and makes them the products of human being. The master enjoys things, but things also have independent character, so the master cannot gain things only with desires. The bondsman (his work) then becomes the medium of his master's enjoyment. The master enjoys things, but he transfers his independent character to things to the bondsman and let the bondsman process and remake things.

Dramatic change then takes place. The master's enjoyment of things depends on the medium of the bondsman. He finds that his independent character is dependent on the bondsman. However, when the master is obliged to recognize the bondsman's independent character, he recognizes that the bondsman is self-consciousness. In the same way, "bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself". "The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsman." (Hegel, 1999, p. 237) The bondsman also realizes his independent character genuinely. Thus, the relation between the master and his bondsman changes into another relation: both recognize that the other side is independent "self-consciousness". In this relation, self does not only recognize that it is the only self-conscious, independent being in the world. Instead, reciprocal recognition takes place among selves. In "The Phenomenology of Geist", Hegel calls this self-consciousness of reciprocal recognition as "general self-consciousness".

It should be pointed out that Fichte first advanced the concept of "recognition". In the process of deducing the concept of right and founding the philosophy of right as practical philosophy according to the principles of the theory of knowledge, Fichte advanced the concept of "recognition". Fichte's theory of recognition undoubtedly had influence on Hegel, but the

more important thing is that Hegel's theory of recognition is fundamentally different from that of Fichte. Surely, we can think of Fichte's introduction of the concept of "the other" and "recognition" in the philosophy of right as a solution to the difficulties encountered in Kant's transcendental discussion: the self-consciousness of freedom is not attained simply through a reflective act. (Henrich, 1982) But the question is: in Fichte, what is the relation between recognition as a transcendental condition of natural right and "absolute self" as ultimate transcendental condition? Undoubtedly, "recognition" of "the other" subjects to "absolute self". That is to say, "recognition" is not absolute and a priori. Not that reciprocal recognition constitutes self, but that "recognition" is constituted of 'transcendental self'. This obviously reflects that Fichte accepts Descartes-Kant philosophical tradition and thinks of transcendental self as a postulate. Thereupon, it also shows that Fichte's practical philosophy that proves the conditions of self-consciousness with "recognition" is not unitary with his theory of knowledge. In Hegel's words, "recognition" of "the other" cannot return to unity with "absolute self". And, as we know, for Hegel, recognition is not a separation of Descartes' transcendental self, but the concretion of self-consciousness as desires. As the condition of self-consciousness, recognition constitutes self-consciousness. It is not the deduction of self-consciousness.

BASIS OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

As a conclusion, I would like to quote a programmatic interpretation on the theory of self-consciousness by Hegel. He says: A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact;

With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what mind is, this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is "we", a plurality of Egos, and "we" that is a

single Ego. Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness, the notion of mind, its turning-point, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight of the present. (Hegel, 1999, p.226 – 227)

This paragraph is significant. I'd like to summarize the significance of Hegel's theory of self-consciousness by analyzing the paragraph. Firstly, by introducing the concept of "the other", i. e. the other self-consciousness, Hegel brings to light the formation of self and self-consciousness from the unity of self and the other, the self-consciousness and the other side. This breaks up the modern philosophical tradition of "I think, therefore I am" and changes the situation that "the other" is absent or is looked upon as menace or negation on modern theory of self-consciousness.

Secondly, because Hegel breaks the preconceived idea of self and self-consciousness in modern philosophy, fundamental change has taken place with the concept of knowledge. Since self-consciousness cannot act as the precondition of epistemology, the epistemological framework on the concept of knowledge seems too limited. For Hegel, only in self-consciousness can consciousness "steps into the spiritual daylight of the present". So the problem of cognition is not theoretical, but practical. That is, cognition makes it a condition that self contacts with the other. Cognition is practical, not only in result, but also in its origin and reference frame. Thereupon, a turn happens in the concept of knowledge. The theory of knowledge turns to practical philosophy. What we face is not cognition at first, but ourselves. But this does not mean the cognition of us. It is a practical process.

It should be pointed out that obvious vestiges of the turn from the theory of knowledge to practical philosophy is found as early as in Kant and Fichte. Kant assigns the knowledge of freedom to the sphere of practice; Fichte advances further the proposition: knowledge should be my whole life. But, just as we have pointed out, they could not get rid of the tradition of Cartesianism essentially. In Hegel's words, they leave "the parti-colored show of the sensuous immediate", but they cannot pass "from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous". The

theory of knowledge is separated from, not unitary with, its practical philosophy. However, Hegel's emphasis on the plural form of self and his constitutive proofs of it show that the basis of practical philosophy has been firmly founded by him. Also in this sense, we see that what Hegel discusses in his theory of self-consciousness is definitely not the subject of epistemology. In order to turn the concept of knowledge to practical philosophy, he understands consciousness as self-consciousness and examines the formation of self-consciousness, which forcefully proves that he is a practical philosopher.

Thirdly, Hegel's substitution of intersubjectivity for subjectivity shows that he realizes the turn from the theory of knowledge to practical philosophy, or, he really establishes the foundation of practical philosophy. "Ego that is 'we', and 'we' that is a single Ego." This means a real universality as reciprocity exists between the other and I. Reciprocal recognition between the other and I means that the other and I are both subjectivity, yet certainly not solipsistic, but intersubjective. Where is the intersubjectivity from? Hegel answers the question with a genealogical examination on self-consciousness and he himself knows clearly that he is answering such a question. In the above quoted paragraph, Hegel speaks of the concept of Geist and thinks of it as decisive turning point. That is to say, the appearance of the concept of Geist, as a conquest of the idea of subjective philosophy (for example, Kant's concept of Gemüt), means that the model of intersubjective philosophy substitutes for that of subjective philosophy. Hegel understands consciousness as its self-cognition, i. e., intersubjective reciprocal recognition. In Chapter 6 section "Geist" of "The Phenomenology of Geist", Hegel calls reciprocal recognition as "absolute Geist". (Hegel, 1999, p.677)

In an important dissertation, J. Habermas points out that Hegel's concept of Geist has two different models. One is an intersubjective model, in which Geist serves not as a foundation but as a communication medium; i. e. an intersubjective medium of access. The other model is as the idealist model, in which the infinite is an infinite accomplished in reflection, not a social infinite. Geist is conceived as a transcendental subject which unconsciously produces nature, and then rediscovers itself in its investigation of

nature, and thereby returns to itself out of nature as its other. (Habermas, 1973) M. Theunissen accepts Habermas' division and thinks further that Hegel's two models bring about confusion obviously and "a satisfactory explanation is excluded in principle". (Williams, 1993)

We raise the same question as Theunissen's: if we look upon intersubjective model of Geist as basic model, transcendental subjectivity cannot function basically, and vice versa. However, we do not try to criticize as M. Theunissen does that Hegel brings about confusion from the incompatibility of the two models. At the same time, we do not try to defend Hegel as P. R. Williams does by proving the compatibility of the two models. (Williams, 1993) In our view, Hegel has never understood Geist as transcendental subject. The key point lies in the relation between nature and intersubjectivity.

Concerning this question, Xue Hua's interpretation in the dissertation that he provided for the 17th International Seminar on Hegel should be noted. In the dissertation named "On Nature and Intersubjectivity by Hegel", the writer points out that Hegel's founding practical philosophy on intersubjectivity does not exclude natural philosophy, on the contrary, the intersubjective foundation is proved, including by natural philosophy. It is an "old preconceived idea" to think that intersubjectivity is incompatible with nature (Xue Hua, 1988). For Hegel, Geist's externalizing as nature is not the process of transcendental self establishing external sensuous world ("non-ego"), certainly not as Habermas understands. It is a proving process of Geist through nature and its cognition. In this sense, the section on "Observation of Nature", which is put in Chapter 5, in "The Phenomenology of Geist", can be advanced reading before Chapter 4, in which the concept of Geist is deduced. For Hegel, observing nature is for the sake of observing self and the cognition of nature is a part of the practical world of man. Nature is not only the object of natural science and technologic operation. It must be understood and recognized in the sense of intersubjectivity. The above fable about the relation between lordship and bondage by Hegel shows this. In this fable, only through the independence of nature can the bondsman reach real natural consciousness and get recognition in his work. Thus, as a thing-in-itself, na-

ture coexists with the intersubjective structure. We can even say that nature and its cognition are the preconditions of intersubjective structure, because in the subjective structure, a subject's being recognized surely means that as a self, not as an object of things, it is identical with other selves. At the same time, it means that its independence and freedom are recognized, which yet means that it embodies the implication of objectivity, otherwise, independence can only be nothing.

It is thus clear that a structural change is realized in Hegel's intersubjective model of philosophy, so nature is united with Geist and a natural relation belongs to the relation of Geist. Thus, the process of Geist externalizing nature and returning to itself supports a more profound proof on intersubjectivity. When J. Habermas, who is greatly influenced by Kantianism, interprets Hegel's Geist, what is neglected by him is the development from Kant to Hegel.

Let us return to Hegel's theory of self-consciousness. Through the above analysis, Hegel's concept of the individual is clear. It is an intersubjective model that substitutes for subjective model. In the intersubjective model resulted from the duality of self-consciousness, Hegel establishes the individual's position at first and confirms the individual's independent character and freedom. A subject's being recognized by the other subject means that his independent character and freedom are recognized. It is an important basis for Hegel to highly appraise that modern philosophy starts with real self-consciousness, at the same time, it forcefully proves that his philosophy is fundamentally different from "totalitarianism". And, Hegel gives concrete stipulations to self-consciousness through the concept of recognition. As we formulated before, the recognition of a subject's independent character and freedom implies objectivity. Otherwise, the independent character is nothing; recognition is unconceivable. On the contrary, the liberal atomistic individual has no concrete stipulations. He is no more than "bare existence", is "the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance", is "its mere absorption in the expanse of life". Hegel holds that this still does not "attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-conscious-

ness" (Hegel, 1999, p. 233). At the same time, through the intersubjective structure of man's existence, Hegel confirms that man is social being; that only in their interrelations can individuals exist and develop and that the individual's freedom depends on the interrelation that must be formed. It is the important grounds for Hegel to reject the subjective idea, which is the basis of modern philosophy, and individualism. He tries to tell us that the fabrication on "state of nature" and "social contract" from the individualist stand is harmful. There is not any state in which man has neither freedom nor dependence, or, man has no dependence, but freedom. The state in which two independent men sign contract does not exist too. Individuals are independent as well as dependent and the two aspects are unitary. Hegel says that Geist is such an "absolute ethical substance": It exists as the unity of the above duality of individual. Hence, the relation between freedom and ethical substance. Thus, Hegel's concept of freedom is really established.

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