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Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
ISSN 2095-9184 (print), ISSN 2095-9230 (online)
2019 Vol.20 No.8 P.1049-1060
Constructing pairing-free certificateless public key encryption with keyword search
Abstract: Searchable public key encryption enables a storage server to retrieve the publicly encrypted data without revealing the original data contents. It offers a perfect cryptographic solution to encrypted data retrieval in encrypted data storage systems. Certificateless cryptography (CLC) is a novel cryptographic primitive that has many merits. It overcomes the key escrow problem in identity-based cryptosystems and the cumbersome certificate problem in conventional public key cryptosystems. Motivated by the appealing features of CLC, three certificateless encryption with keyword search (CLEKS) schemes were presented in the literature. However, all of them were constructed with the costly bilinear pairing and thus are not suitable for the devices that have limited computing resources and battery power. So, it is interesting and worthwhile to design a CLEKS scheme without using bilinear pairing. In this study, we put forward a pairing-free CLEKS scheme that does not exploit bilinear pairing. We strictly prove that the scheme achieves keyword ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks under the complexity assumption of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Efficiency comparison and the simulation show that it enjoys better performance than the previous pairing-based CLEKS schemes. In addition, we briefly introduce three extensions of the proposed CLEKS scheme.
Key words: Searchable public key encryption, Certificateless public key encryption with keyword search, Bilinear pairing, Computational Diffie-Hellman problem
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DOI:
10.1631/FITEE.1700534
CLC number:
TP309
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On-line Access:
2024-08-27
Received:
2023-10-17
Revision Accepted:
2024-05-08
Crosschecked:
2019-08-15