CLC number: TP309.2
On-line Access: 2024-08-27
Received: 2023-10-17
Revision Accepted: 2024-05-08
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Chang-da WANG, Shi-guang JU. Integrated criteria for covert channel auditing[J]. Journal of Zhejiang University Science A, 2008, 9(6): 737-743.
@article{title="Integrated criteria for covert channel auditing",
author="Chang-da WANG, Shi-guang JU",
journal="Journal of Zhejiang University Science A",
volume="9",
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pages="737-743",
year="2008",
publisher="Zhejiang University Press & Springer",
doi="10.1631/jzus.A071510"
}
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%DOI 10.1631/jzus.A071510
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T1 - Integrated criteria for covert channel auditing
A1 - Chang-da WANG
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J0 - Journal of Zhejiang University Science A
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Y1 - 2008
PB - Zhejiang University Press & Springer
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DOI - 10.1631/jzus.A071510
Abstract: A new concept, the security level difference of a covert channel, is presented, which means the security level span from the sender to the receiver of the covert channel. Based on this, the integrated criteria for covert channel auditing are given. Whereas TCSEC (Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) or CC (Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation) only use the bandwidth to evaluate the threat of covert channels, our new criteria integrate the security level difference, the bandwidth sensitive parameter, bandwidth, duration and instantaneous time of covert channels, so as to give a comprehensive evaluation of the threat of covert channels in a multilevel security system.
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