CLC number: TP309
On-line Access: 2024-08-27
Received: 2023-10-17
Revision Accepted: 2024-05-08
Crosschecked: 2017-12-20
Cited: 0
Clicked: 7974
Li-bing Wu, Jing Wang, De-biao He, Muhammad-Khurram Khan. Cryptanalysis of an identity-based public auditing protocol for cloud storage[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2017, 18(12): 1972-1977.
@article{title="Cryptanalysis of an identity-based public auditing protocol for cloud storage",
author="Li-bing Wu, Jing Wang, De-biao He, Muhammad-Khurram Khan",
journal="Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering",
volume="18",
number="12",
pages="1972-1977",
year="2017",
publisher="Zhejiang University Press & Springer",
doi="10.1631/FITEE.1601530"
}
%0 Journal Article
%T Cryptanalysis of an identity-based public auditing protocol for cloud storage
%A Li-bing Wu
%A Jing Wang
%A De-biao He
%A Muhammad-Khurram Khan
%J Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
%V 18
%N 12
%P 1972-1977
%@ 2095-9184
%D 2017
%I Zhejiang University Press & Springer
%DOI 10.1631/FITEE.1601530
TY - JOUR
T1 - Cryptanalysis of an identity-based public auditing protocol for cloud storage
A1 - Li-bing Wu
A1 - Jing Wang
A1 - De-biao He
A1 - Muhammad-Khurram Khan
J0 - Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
VL - 18
IS - 12
SP - 1972
EP - 1977
%@ 2095-9184
Y1 - 2017
PB - Zhejiang University Press & Springer
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DOI - 10.1631/FITEE.1601530
Abstract: Public verification of data integrity is crucial for promoting the serviceability of cloud storage systems. Recently, Tan and Jia (2014) proposed an identity-based public verification (NaEPASC) protocol for cloud data to simplify key management and alleviate the burden of check tasks. They claimed that NaEPASC enables a third-party auditor (TPA) to verify the integrity of outsourced data with high efficiency and security in a cloud computing environment. However, in this paper, we pinpoint that NaEPASC is vulnerable to the signature forgery attack in the setup phase; i.e., a malicious cloud server can forge a valid signature for an arbitrary data block by using two correct signatures. Moreover, we demonstrate that NaEPASC is subject to data privacy threats in the challenge phase; i.e., an external attacker acting as a TPA can reveal the content of outsourced data. The analysis shows that NaEPASC is not secure in the data verification process. Therefore, our work is helpful for cryptographers and engineers to design and implement more secure and efficient identity-based public auditing schemes for cloud storage.
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