Full Text:   <849>

Summary:  <892>

CLC number: TP311.5

On-line Access: 2021-02-01

Received: 2019-12-23

Revision Accepted: 2020-06-30

Crosschecked: 2020-12-11

Cited: 0

Clicked: 1858

Citations:  Bibtex RefMan EndNote GB/T7714


Yao Xia


Zhiqiu Huang


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Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering  2021 Vol.22 No.2 P.185-201


A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences

Author(s):  Yao Xia, Zhiqiu Huang

Affiliation(s):  College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China

Corresponding email(s):   xiayao@nuaa.edu.cn, zqhuang@nuaa.edu.cn

Key Words:  Combinatorial reverse auction, Service composition, User preference, Strategy-proof, Dynamic pricing

Yao Xia, Zhiqiu Huang. A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2021, 22(2): 185-201.

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publisher="Zhejiang University Press & Springer",

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%D 2021
%I Zhejiang University Press & Springer
%DOI 10.1631/FITEE.1900726

T1 - A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences
A1 - Yao Xia
A1 - Zhiqiu Huang
J0 - Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
VL - 22
IS - 2
SP - 185
EP - 201
%@ 2095-9184
Y1 - 2021
PB - Zhejiang University Press & Springer
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DOI - 10.1631/FITEE.1900726

service composition is an effective method of combining existing atomic services into a value-added service based on cost and quality of service (QoS). To meet the diverse needs of users and to offer pricing services based on QoS, we propose a service composition auction mechanism based on user preferences, which is strategy-proof and can be beneficial in selecting services based on user preferences and dynamically determining the price of services. We have proven that the proposed auction mechanism achieves desirable properties including truthfulness and individual rationality. Furthermore, we propose an auction algorithm to implement the auction mechanism, and carry out extensive experiments based on real data. The results verify that the proposed auction mechanism not only achieves desirable properties, but also helps users find a satisfactory service composition scheme.





Darkslateblue:Affiliate; Royal Blue:Author; Turquoise:Article


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