CLC number: TP309
On-line Access: 2024-08-27
Received: 2023-10-17
Revision Accepted: 2024-05-08
Crosschecked: 0000-00-00
Cited: 0
Clicked: 7056
XIAO Qing-hua, PING Ling-di, CHEN Xiao-ping, PAN Xue-zeng. Applying two channels to vector space secret sharing based multi-signature scheme[J]. Journal of Zhejiang University Science A, 2005, 6(1): 56-62.
@article{title="Applying two channels to vector space secret sharing based multi-signature scheme",
author="XIAO Qing-hua, PING Ling-di, CHEN Xiao-ping, PAN Xue-zeng",
journal="Journal of Zhejiang University Science A",
volume="6",
number="1",
pages="56-62",
year="2005",
publisher="Zhejiang University Press & Springer",
doi="10.1631/jzus.2005.A0056"
}
%0 Journal Article
%T Applying two channels to vector space secret sharing based multi-signature scheme
%A XIAO Qing-hua
%A PING Ling-di
%A CHEN Xiao-ping
%A PAN Xue-zeng
%J Journal of Zhejiang University SCIENCE A
%V 6
%N 1
%P 56-62
%@ 1673-565X
%D 2005
%I Zhejiang University Press & Springer
%DOI 10.1631/jzus.2005.A0056
TY - JOUR
T1 - Applying two channels to vector space secret sharing based multi-signature scheme
A1 - XIAO Qing-hua
A1 - PING Ling-di
A1 - CHEN Xiao-ping
A1 - PAN Xue-zeng
J0 - Journal of Zhejiang University Science A
VL - 6
IS - 1
SP - 56
EP - 62
%@ 1673-565X
Y1 - 2005
PB - Zhejiang University Press & Springer
ER -
DOI - 10.1631/jzus.2005.A0056
Abstract: Secret sharing and digital signature is an important research area in information security and has wide applications in such fields as safeguarding and legal use of confidential information, secure multiparty computation and electronic commerce. But up to now, study of signature based on general vector space secret sharing is very weak. Aiming at this drawback, the authors did some research on vector space secret sharing against cheaters, and proposed an efficient but secure vector space secret sharing based multi-signature scheme, which is implemented in two channels. In this scheme, the group signature can be easily produced if an authorized subset of participants pool their secret shadows and it is impossible for them to generate a group signature if an unauthorized subset of participants pool their secret shadows. The validity of the group signature can be verified by means of verification equations. A group signature of authorized subset of participants cannot be impersonated by any other set of participants. Moreover, the suspected forgery can be traced, and the malicious participants can be detected in the scheme. None of several possible attacks can successfully break this scheme.
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