Full Text:   <5340>

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CLC number: TP316.4

On-line Access: 2022-04-20

Received: 2020-10-13

Revision Accepted: 2022-05-04

Crosschecked: 2021-01-21

Cited: 0

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Citations:  Bibtex RefMan EndNote GB/T7714




Qiang WEI


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Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering  2022 Vol.23 No.4 P.587-603


Detection and localization of cyber attacks on water treatment systems: an entropy-based approach

Author(s):  Ke LIU, Mufeng WANG, Rongkuan MA, Zhenyong ZHANG, Qiang WEI

Affiliation(s):  State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing, Zhengzhou 450001, China; more

Corresponding email(s):   bendawang@gmail.com, csewmf@zju.edu.cn, rongkuan233@gmail.com, zhangzhenyong@zju.edu.cn, funnywei@163.com

Key Words:  Industrial cyber-physical system, Water treatment system, Intrusion detection, Abnormal state, Detection and localization, Information theory

Ke LIU, Mufeng WANG, Rongkuan MA, Zhenyong ZHANG, Qiang WEI. Detection and localization of cyber attacks on water treatment systems: an entropy-based approach[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2022, 23(4): 587-603.

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publisher="Zhejiang University Press & Springer",

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T1 - Detection and localization of cyber attacks on water treatment systems: an entropy-based approach
A1 - Ke LIU
A1 - Mufeng WANG
A1 - Rongkuan MA
A1 - Zhenyong ZHANG
A1 - Qiang WEI
J0 - Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
VL - 23
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PB - Zhejiang University Press & Springer
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DOI - 10.1631/FITEE.2000546

With the advent of Industry 4.0, water treatment systems (WTSs) are recognized as typical industrial cyber-physical systems (iCPSs) that are connected to the open Internet. Advanced information technology (IT) benefits the WTS in the aspects of reliability, efficiency, and economy. However, the vulnerabilities exposed in the communication and control infrastructure on the cyber side make WTSs prone to cyber attacks. The traditional IT system oriented defense mechanisms cannot be directly applied in safety-critical WTSs because the availability and real-time requirements are of great importance. In this paper, we propose an entropy-based intrusion detection (EBID) method to thwart cyber attacks against widely used controllers (e.g., programmable logic controllers) in WTSs to address this issue. Because of the varied WTS operating conditions, there is a high false-positive rate with a static threshold for detection. Therefore, we propose a dynamic threshold adjustment mechanism to improve the performance of EBID. To validate the performance of the proposed approaches, we built a high-fidelity WTS testbed with more than 50 measurement points. We conducted experiments under two attack scenarios with a total of 36 attacks, showing that the proposed methods achieved a detection rate of 97.22% and a false alarm rate of 1.67%.




Darkslateblue:Affiliate; Royal Blue:Author; Turquoise:Article


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