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Abstract: moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as one of the game-changing themes to alter the asymmetric situation between attacks and defenses in cyber-security. Numerous related works involving several facets of MTD have been published. However, comprehensive analyses and research on MTD are still absent. In this paper, we present a survey on MTD technologies to scientifically and systematically introduce, categorize, and summarize the existing research works in this field. First, a new security model is introduced to describe the changes in the traditional defense paradigm and security model caused by the introduction of MTD. A function-and-movement model is provided to give a panoramic overview on different perspectives for understanding the existing MTD research works. Then a systematic interpretation of published literature is presented to describe the state of the art of the three main areas in the MTD field, namely, MTD theory, MTD strategy, and MTD evaluation. Specifically, in the area of MTD strategy, the common characteristics shared by the MTD strategies to improve system security and effectiveness are identified and extrapolated. Thereafter, the methods to implement these characteristics are concluded. Moreover, the MTD strategies are classified into three types according to their specific goals, and the necessary and sufficient conditions of each type to create effective MTD strategies are then summarized, which are typically one or more of the aforementioned characteristics. Finally, we provide a number of observations for the future direction in this field, which can be helpful for subsequent researchers.

移动目标防御：现状及特征

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